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COMMENT
DRUG WAR: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
COUNTER-NARCOTICS
JASON RAETHER*
INTRODUCTION
In 2006, the fishermen of Ondame, a small fishing village in Guinea-
Bissau, came across something that would change their country forever.1 A
smuggling boat had sunk offshore and packages of pure Columbian co-
caine, some weighing as much as thirty kilograms, were scooped up by the
villagers.2 Not knowing what they had, some villagers used the powder as
fertilizer, killing their crops in the process, while others tried it as food
seasoning.3 When two men showed up with $1 million in buy-back cash,
Guinea-Bissau’s transformation into a narco-state had begun.4 Within eigh-
teen months, £150 million worth of cocaine was flowing from Guinea-Bis-
sau each month, equal to the worth of the country’s GDP over the course of
an entire year.5 Corruption ran rampant and, at one point, a seized stash of
674 kilograms of cocaine disappeared from Guinea-Bissau’s treasury after
men in military uniforms opened the vault for “counting.”6 Meanwhile, two
Columbians caught with the cocaine were set free.7
* Juris Doctor, magna cum laude, University of St. Thomas School of Law. I wish to thank
Robert Delahunty, Mitchell Gordon, Neil Hamilton and Scott Swanson for sharing their passion
for the law and its ethical practice. I also wish to thank the staff of the University of St. Thomas
Law Journal for their hard work in correcting my many errors. Finally, I wish to thank my family,
and especially my wife Julie, for their love and support.
1. Colin Freeman, The African Gateway for UK Cocaine, THE TELEGRAPH, June 10, 2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1554135/The-African-gateway-for-UK-cocaine.
html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Colin Freeman, The African Gateway for UK Cocaine, THE TELEGRAPH, June 10, 2007,
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1554135/The-African-gateway-for-UK-cocaine.
html.
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In 2010, on the other side of the ocean from Guinea-Bissau, a group of
high school students was celebrating a friend’s fifteenth birthday.8 The
birthday boy and his family lived in Ciudad Jua´rez, a city where two of
Mexico’s most powerful Drug Trade Organizations (DTOs) battle for con-
trol.9 More than 2000 people had already died that year in violent attacks
that took place in bars and restaurants, so the boy’s mother believed it
would be safer to hold the celebration at their house.10 A gunman arrived
during the party and asked about a car parked in front of the house.11 When
no one answered his questions, he opened fire with a pistol, killing thirteen
people at the party, most of whom were high school students.12 The attacker
escaped and the police had no information with which to track down the
killer.13 Given the level of violence in the city and the ability of DTOs to
kill with relative impunity, it is unlikely any informants will be stepping
forward.14 Sadly, this story is nothing new in a country plagued by horror
stories of drug-related violence.
This Comment will analyze the options for an international, and intra-
national, response to the drug trade through the rubric of international law.
In Part I, this Comment will examine traditional concepts of statehood and
how those concepts are distorted in countries called “narco-states,” where
the flow of narcotics dwarfs any legitimate economy. In doing so, the Com-
ment will distinguish between “pure narco-states,” or countries where the
narcotics trade has virtually dominated all aspects of government, and “hy-
brid narco-states,” or countries where the presence of narcotics have sub-
verted but have not eliminated the rule of law. The Comment will then
examine how the U.N. Charter applies to narco-states, and, specifically,
how it hinders international drug-fighting efforts.
In Part II, the Comment will shift focus from an international to an
intra-national response to the narcotics trade. It will begin by using Mexico
as an example of a state ripped apart by drug-fueled violence, describing
some of the DTOs operating within the country as well as efforts made so
far to restore the rule of law. The Comment will define International Hu-
manitarian Law (IHL) and explain some of its sources. The Comment will
then apply IHL, particularly customary IHL regarding non-international
armed conflicts, to Mexico’s struggles to curb the DTO violence. Finally,
8. Olivia Torres, Mexico: 13 Dead in Massacre at House Party in Jua´rez, EL PASO TIMES,
Oct. 23, 2010, http://www.elpasotimes.com/newupdated/ci_16415786.
9. Id. Because they are not involved in the price-fixing and other collusive economic activ-
ity, the organizations are more accurately termed Drug Trade Organizations rather than drug car-
tels. JUNE S. BEITTEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41576, MEXICO’S DRUG TRAFFICKING
ORGANIZATIONS: SOURCE AND SCOPE OF THE RISING VIOLENCE 1 (2011).
10. Torres, supra note 8.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See id.
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the Comment will detail how IHL changes the ways in which Mexico may
confront the DTOs within its borders. Mexico may respond to DTOs as
enemies in war while DTOs are subject to additional criminal sanctions
within the framework of international law. While the U.N. Charter limits
the options available to third parties in confronting narco-trafficking, this
Comment will show that IHL provides Mexico with considerable latitude in
confronting non-state actors operating within its borders.
I. U.N. CHARTER LAW
A. Narcotics and Traditional Concepts of Statehood
According to Hobbes, a state is a contract between citizens and a gov-
erning body, whereby citizens transfer power to a “commonwealth” in re-
turn for “peace and common defence.”15 More recently, Max Weber
defined a state as a “compulsory political association with continuous or-
ganization” that has an “administrative staff [which] successfully upholds a
claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force in the enforce-
ment of its order.”16 Legitimate uses of physical force include maintaining
law and order within the state, defending against external attacks, caring for
the bodily and spiritual welfare of citizens at home, and protecting citizens
abroad.17 A narco-state is created when the prevailing influence of the drug
trade has distorted the traditional concept and legitimate functions of state-
hood. The drug trade affects states differently, however, and it is important
to distinguish between two different types of narco-states: pure narco-states
and hybrid narco-states.
1. Pure Narco-States
In a pure narco-state, the state is subsumed by the drug trade and the
legitimacy of its government is in question. Third-world nations are particu-
larly susceptible to corruption as drug traffickers can offer government offi-
cials many times their yearly salary in bribes.18 High-ranking officials may
even become directly involved in the drug trade, such as in Guinea-Bissau
where the military is run by known drug traffickers.19 Pure narco-states
distort the principles of statehood in many ways. In a pure narco-state, the
social contract is broken through a steady process of corruption that eventu-
ally reaches the highest echelons of a state’s government. A pure narco-
15. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 109 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1994) (1668).
16. MAX WEBER, THE THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 154 (Talcott Par-
sons ed., Collier-Macmillan Canada, Ltd. 1st paperback ed. 1964).
17. See Alfred von Verdross, Forbidden Treaties in International Law: Comments on Profes-
sor Garner’s Report on “The Law of Treaties”, 31 AM. J. INT’L L. 571, 574 (1937) (listing the
minimum functions of a state).
18. See U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010, 242 (U.N. Sales
No. E.10.XI.13 2010).
19. Id.
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state may fulfill some of the basic functions of governance, but only in so
far as they advance profits for the de facto government.20 When the basic
functions of governance get in the way of profit, those basic functions will
be dropped.21 A pure narco-state may have a monopoly on the use of force,
though Weber’s definition of statehood does not apply since the pursuit of
illicit profits is not a legitimate use of force.22
Despite a lack of legitimacy, pure narco-states retain statehood status.
Traditional international law holds that states only become extinct in a lim-
ited number of circumstances: the state incorporates into another, the state
is annexed by another state, the state fuses into one or more other states, or
the state is dismembered into smaller units.23 The transition of a state into a
pure narco-state fits none of those categories. Thus, pure narco-states main-
tain their status as a state, even though they do not conform to any tradi-
tional concept of statehood.
2. Hybrid Narco-States
Hybrid narco-states exist when a state’s government retains a core of
legitimacy, but its resources are overwhelmed by drug-funded non-state ac-
tors. Belize serves as an example of a hybrid narco-state. Up to 37% of the
cocaine destined for the U.S. passes through the borders of this tiny Central
American country.24 Belize seizes large amounts of cocaine, however, at
one time capturing 2.4 tons in a single seizure.25 Thus despite the huge
amount of cocaine passing through its borders, the government of Belize
has not been completely subverted by the drug trade and Belize could not
be considered a pure narco-state. While there is likely some corruption pre-
sent, the core of the government still strives to uphold Hobbes’s social
contract.
Hybrid narco-states may be further distinguished from pure narco-
states based on the motives of the drug-traffickers. Unlike a pure narco-
state, where the government and drug-traffickers work hand in hand to max-
imize profit, the drug trade is used in some hybrid narco-states to fuel an
insurgency that is actively fighting legitimate government forces. This is the
case in Columbia, where the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
(Spanish: Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or “FARC”) use
the sale of cocaine to finance its operations.26 Other examples include Af-
20. Government involvement in drug trafficking can actually decrease violence since high-
level corruption obviates the need for open conflict. See id. at 244.
21. See id. at 245 (“Any sudden change, whether it be in volumes or players, seems to have
the potential to set off a violent competition for opportunity.”).
22. See WEBER, supra note 16, at 154.
23. CHIARA GIORGETTI, A PRINCIPLED APPROACH TO STATE FAILURE 52 (2010).
24. U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA
47–48 (U.N. Sales No. B.07.IV.5 2007).
25. Id.
26. WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010, supra note 18, at 71.
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ghanistan and Myanmar, where rebel forces are funded by heroin produc-
tion.27 While the actions of these rebel groups may be viewed as a domestic
and not an international problem, it is important to note that the majority of
the drugs produced within a narco-state (hybrid or otherwise) are destined
for the international market.28
Any country heavily afflicted by the drug trade will contain elements
of both pure and hybrid narco-states. Hybrid narco-states will often have
massive government corruption,29 while pure narco-states will experience
conflict between non-state actors and legitimate, if ineffective, government
forces.30 It is important to keep these categories distinct for the purpose of
applying international law, though, and the analysis that follows will ad-
dress pure and hybrid narco-states as separate categories.31
B. State Sovereignty
At the outset, the U.N. Charter explains that the U.N. exists “[t]o main-
tain international peace and security.”32 Specifically, the Charter provides
that the U.N. should be engaged “in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character.”33 Based on these
goals, it would seem the U.N. Charter would be a perfect tool for con-
fronting narco-states since they are a problem of an economic, social, cul-
tural, and humanitarian character. However, these lofty purposes are in
tension with another guiding principle of the U.N. Charter—that of sover-
eign equality between all member states.34 To protect this sovereignty, the
Charter forbids “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state.”35
27. Id. at 232.
28. See id. at 38–39 (explaining that Afghanistan provides 85% of the global heroin supply,
though it accounts for only 7% of the actual demand); see also CRIME AND DEVELOPMENT IN
CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 24, at 49 (illustrating that only a small percentage of cocaine flow
remains in some transit countries).
29. While accurate figures on government corruption are difficult to track, perception of
corruption in public figures ranges from 63% to 77% in Central American countries. CRIME AND
DEVELOPMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 24, at 71.
30. In Guinea-Bissau, Tagme na Wai, the head of the army, was killed in an attack that was
blamed on the president and, in return, forces loyal to Tagme na Wai attacked the presidential
palace and killed the president. WORLD DRUG REPORT, supra note 18, at 243. Though admittedly
both groups could be labeled state actors, the men carrying out the attacks were clearly not acting
within the apparatus of the state.
31. This article will not attempt the difficult task of determining where a particular state
resides on the pure narco-state / hybrid narco-state spectrum. If one wishes to make this determi-
nation, relevant factors would include the level of involvement of high-ranking officials and the
influence narcotics have on the armed forces. See id. at 244.
32. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
33. Id. at art. 1, para. 3.
34. Id. at art. 2, para. 1.
35. Id. at art. 2, para. 4.
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Because there is no language in the U.N. Charter qualifying the sover-
eignty of questionably legitimate states, the principle of state sovereignty
prevents foreign states affected by the drug trade from using armed force
within narco-states in order to combat the international drug trade. The In-
ternational Court of Justice (ICJ) spoke to the conflict between state sover-
eignty and crime-fighting efforts in Costa Rica v. Nicaragua.36 There,
Costa Rica instituted proceedings against Nicaragua, asserting that Nicara-
gua was violating the principle of state sovereignty by sending armed forces
into its territory.37 Nicaragua disputed the allegation that it had crossed any
territorial lines.38 It also argued that it was necessary to place security
forces in the disputed territory in order to combat drug trafficking in the
area.39 The ICJ recognized the need to prevent crime, but forbade both par-
ties from sending security forces into the disputed territory.40 Thus, state
sovereignty took precedence over crime prevention, even when ownership
of the targeted territory was in dispute.
In most cases, narco-states will be protected by clear borders and the
argument for state sovereignty will be even stronger. This is especially true
in the case of pure narco-states, where the cartel acting as the de facto gov-
ernment is directly protected by state sovereignty. The drug cartels in hy-
brid narco-states will also be protected by state sovereignty unless the
legitimate government of the host state explicitly invites third-party inter-
vention.41 Even if a host state invites third-party intervention, it may be
rescinded, as was demonstrated in 2008 when President Morales expelled
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency from Bolivia.42 Because the Charter
specifically prevents the U.N. from intervening “in matters which are essen-
tially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state,”43 governments in a
narco-state may claim that the issue is domestic and thus outside the scope
of the U.N.’s authority.
C. The Security Council
According to Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council
may take action when it determines there is a “threat to the peace, breach of
36. Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.),
2011 I.C.J. 150, ¶ 78 (Mar. 8) (Order), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/150/16324.
pdf.
37. Id. ¶ 2. Costa Rica made other allegations, though they are not relevant to the discussion
here.
38. Id. ¶ 70.
39. Id. ¶ 72.
40. Id. ¶¶ 78, 86.
41. See Sylvain Vite´, Typology of Armed Conflicts in International Humanitarian Law: Le-
gal Concepts and Actual Situations, 91 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 69, 72 (2009).
42. Country watchlist: Bolivia, ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT – BUS. LATIN AM., Nov. 10,
2008, at 13.
43. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
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the peace, or act of aggression.”44 Acceptable measures include the imposi-
tion of sanctions,45 and “such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be
necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.”46 Except
for a limited exception discussed below, the Security Council is the only
venue the U.N. Charter provides for countries that wish to use force in
response to a threat.
Unfortunately, the Security Council is unlikely to become an effective
component in the international war on drugs. First, sanctions against narco-
states would be useless. In the case of a pure narco-state, the majority of the
government’s funding comes from smuggling illegal goods and any further
ban on trade would be moot. For similar reasons, non-state actors in a hy-
brid state would be unaffected by sanctions. Additionally, in hybrid narco-
states such as Belize, the sanctions could have the effect of punishing a
legitimate government. The Security Council has the power to authorize the
use of force, but since the end of the Cold War, it has rarely done so.47 Even
when the Security Council has acted, its response has been sluggish and
poorly implemented, as was shown in Somalia, Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.48
Because narco-states adapt quickly in the face of challenge,49 it is unlikely
the Security Council will provide an effective response to the problems they
pose.
D. The Right of Self-Defense
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter allows self-defense if “an armed attack
occurs against a Member of the United Nations.”50 This right does have
limitations, however. First, the right to self-defense may not be used when
“the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain interna-
tional peace and security.”51 In other words, the Security Council of the
United Nations may preempt a state’s ability to deal with a perceived threat.
Other requirements in the use of self-defense include necessity, proportion-
ality, and immediacy.52 The exact threshold as to when a state has the right
to respond with force according to Article 51 has not been settled, but it is
unlikely one can aggregate small incidents in order to trigger the right to
respond with force in self-defense.53
44. Id. at art. 39.
45. Id. at art. 41.
46. Id. at art. 42.
47. GIORGETTI, supra note 23, at 166.
48. Id. at 170; NOAM LUBELL, EXTRATERRITORIAL USE OF FORCE AGAINST NON-STATE AC-
TORS 44 (2011).
49. WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010, supra note 18, at 245.
50. U.N. Charter, art. 7, para. 51.
51. Id.
52. LUBELL, supra note 48, at 43–44.
53. Id. at 50, 53.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST311.txt unknown Seq: 8 10-MAY-13 14:21
940 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
Pure narco-states are unlikely to risk a profitable enterprise by attack-
ing a foreign state on a scale that would trigger the right to self-defense.
Pure narco-states may intimidate or kill citizens of a foreign state and the
drugs which they distribute may damage another country’s social land-
scape, but this is not enough to trigger the right to self-defense. As an ex-
ample, in 1988, the U.S. began planning an invasion of Panama.54 The
purpose of this invasion was ostensibly to apprehend Manual Noriega, a
former intelligence officer who had risen to power and who had cultivated
ties with known Columbian drug traffickers.55 When the Security Council
considered whether it should pass a resolution condemning the subsequent
U.S. invasion of Panama, the U.S. argued that its invasion of Panama was
an act of self-defense, triggered by the killing of a serviceman, the terror-
izing of a U.S. military couple, and the intimidation and instability engi-
neered by Noriega.56 The U.S. ambassador also described Noriega’s “first
deal with narcotic peddlers” as an act of war due to the deleterious effects
of drugs on the nation’s youth.57 The resolution condemning the U.S. inva-
sion of Panama received ten favorable votes out of fourteen.58 This lack of
support for a broad interpretation of Article 51 renders it unlikely that the
right to self-defense could be extended to cover the problems created by
pure narco-states.
Because conflict is more likely without high-level corruption,59 non-
state actors in hybrid narco-states may engage in acts of violence that could
reach the threshold of triggering self-defense under Article 51. The ICJ has
ruled that self-defense may not be invoked in response to a non-state ac-
tor,60 though the Court in later cases raised questions about this ruling.61
Given state practice and the rising prevalence of non-state actors on the
world stage, as well as the events of September 11, 2001, it would seem
Article 51 would apply to armed attacks by non-state actors.62 Regardless,
this issue is still unresolved.63 Due to the lack of legal certainty and the high
threshold to trigger its application, Article 51 provides a poor remedy for
54. RONALD H. COLE, OPERATION JUST CAUSE: THE PLANNING AND EXECUTION OF JOINT
OPERATIONS IN PANAMA 7 (1995).
55. Id. at 6, 7. Panama was also considered an essential military asset because the Panama
Canal would allow naval ships to move quickly between the Pacific and Atlantic in the event there
was a conflict in Western Europe or the Middle East. Id. at 5.
56. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2902d mtg. at 9–10, U.N. Doc. S/PV.2902 (1989).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 18–20. The four votes in opposition were all veto votes, however, rendering the
resolution moot. Id.
59. WORLD DRUG REPORT 2010, supra note 18, at 244.
60. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory,
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 139 (July 9, 2004).
61. LUBELL, supra note 48, at 33.
62. Id. at 34.
63. Id.
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countries looking to implement armed forces in response to non-state actors
in hybrid narco-states.
Narco-states present a unique challenge for the international commu-
nity. They are a distortion of traditional statehood and they present tremen-
dous obstacles to legitimate state objectives. Though it is posited as a
document designed to promote international peace and security, the U.N.
Charter creates numerous obstacles for countries looking to employ all nec-
essary means to combat drug trafficking. Thus, to develop a legal frame-
work that could provide that basis for a military intervention in a narco-
state, countries must look elsewhere.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW
As demonstrated above, the U.N. Charter does not provide state actors
with effective tools to confront Drug Trade Organizations (DTOs) outside
their borders. Fortunately, few countries are pure narco-states and even
those with a substantial drug trade still have a legitimate core to their gov-
ernment. In these situations, the legitimate governments of hybrid narco-
states may represent the best opportunity for reducing drug-trafficking.
These countries may resort to their domestic laws to confront drug-traffick-
ers, but there is another body of law that applies to all states. Called Interna-
tional Humanitarian Law (IHL), or alternately the law of war, this body of
law is derived from the customary practices of nations and has been codi-
fied to some extent in the Geneva Conventions and its related protocols.
IHL determines the ability of the state-actor to respond to threats and, when
a situation rises to the level of an armed conflict, IHL grants the state-actor
broad latitude in dealing with those threats.
This part will use Mexico as an example of a hybrid narco-state torn
by drug-fueled violence but which has a legitimate government that is op-
posed to the drug trade. Because it is plagued by violence but is still in-
volved in the fight to end drug trafficking, Mexico serves as an ideal
example of a hybrid narco-state that would benefit from the application of
IHL. This part will start with an examination of the DTOs functioning in
Mexico along with some explanation of the effects they have had on the
country. It will then examine the sources of IHL including some of the
treaty law as well as customary international law. Then this part will apply
IHL, specifically the law of non-international armed conflict, to the conflict
between state actors and DTOs. Finally, this part will show how IHL pro-
vides Mexico with the right to use military action to confront DTOs, subject
to certain limitations.
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A. The Conflict with DTOs in Mexico
1. Organization of DTOs
Before evaluating the framework of law that applies to the conflict in
Mexico, it is useful to examine the actors involved. While the Mexican
government is clearly a state actor, the categorization of DTOs is not so
easy. State actors are defined by their relationship to a state government and
are either a direct branch of the government or an organization that is con-
trolled by the government.64 Though DTOs occasionally work with other
DTOs, they are independent organizations and, as independent organiza-
tions, they are not part of a branch of government nor is there any sign that
they are controlled by a state-actor.65 For these reasons, DTOs should be
qualified as non-state actors.
Currently, there are seven major DTOs operating in Mexico.66 These
DTOs have elements of organized crime, such as organizing into distinct
branches with subordinate cells that operate throughout Mexico and the
U.S.67 DTOs that were once hierarchical and vertical organizations are be-
coming multi-nodal and horizontal in structure, some operating with inde-
pendent cell-like structures.68 Mexican DTOs focus only on wholesale
distribution of drugs, leaving retail sales to localized street gangs.69 In addi-
tion to drug trafficking, Mexican DTOs have ties to human trafficking, arms
smuggling, auto theft, and kidnapping.70 To accomplish their goals, DTOs
use a combination of violence and bribery.71
2. Specific Mexican DTOs
The Sinaloa DTO is currently the dominant DTO and is estimated to
control up to 45% of the drug trade in Mexico.72 The Sinaloa cartel gained
this position after wresting the Gulf Cartel, the previously dominant cartel,
from its seat of power in 2003.73 Sinaloa has a de-centralized structure of
linked smaller organizations.74 While this means that it is more prone to
internal conflict, this loose structure allows it to adapt more rapidly to the
64. See LUBELL, supra note 48, at 15.
65. See COLLEEN W. COOK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34215, MEXICO’S DRUG CARTELS 1
(2007).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4–5.
68. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 18.
69. COOK, supra note 65, at 6.
70. Id.
71. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 4.
72. Id. at 8; see Richard Marosi, Unraveling Mexico’s Sinaloa Drug Cartel, L.A. TIMES, July
24, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jul/24/local/la-me-cartel-20110724 (describing the Sina-
loa drug cartel as “Mexico’s most powerful organized crime group”).
73. Marosi, supra note 72.
74. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 6.
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highly competitive and unstable drug market.75 More so than the other
DTOs, Sinaloa is regarded as having an international presence stretching
throughout South America, Europe, and West Africa.76 Along with other
major DTOs, Sinaloa has employed armed groups to conduct assassinations
and kidnappings and to collect payments.77
The Zetas were once employed by the Gulf Cartel to provide enforce-
ment and security.78 Originally formed by officers who deserted from the
Mexican Special Forces in the late 1990s,79 the Zetas have expanded to
include former federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel.80 The
Zetas operate as a private army and were among the first criminal groups in
Mexico to employ military tactics and heavy weapons, including fifty-cali-
ber machine guns, grenade launchers and ground-to-air missiles.81 In 2009,
the Zetas splintered off from their former employers and became an inde-
pendent DTO.82 The Zetas have since been involved in back and forth bat-
tles with the Gulf Cartel as the Gulf Cartel struggles with a lack of
consistent leadership.83 In addition to the usual abductions and murders, the
ensuing battle has created an environment of urban warfare with com-
mando-style raids on state prisons, attacks on military posts, and blockades
of major roads.84
Perhaps the strangest DTO is La Familia Michoacana (LFM). LFM
started as a vigilante group before it moved on to methamphetamine pro-
duction and smuggling.85 It also traffics in cocaine, marijuana, and heroin.86
LFM is known for its use of extreme symbolic violence and the pseudo-
ideological or religious justifications for its actions.87 It has therefore been
described as “a hybrid fusion of criminal drug enterprise entity and Chris-
tian evangelical beliefs.”88 LFM has donated food and medicine to the
75. Id.
76. Id. at 9.
77. COOK, supra note 65, at 6, 8.
78. Jeremy Roebuck, Gulf Cartel, Zetas gang up on each other as their arrangement dies,
authorities say, THE MONITOR, Mar. 9, 2010, available at http://usmexico.blogspot.com/2010/03/
violence-result-of-fractured.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2013).
79. COOK, supra note 65, at 7.
80. Id. at 7.
81. Corey Flintoff, A Look at Mexico’s Drug Cartels, NPR (Apr. 16, 2009), http://www.npr.
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103178523.
82. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 10.
83. Roebuck, supra note 78.
84. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 10.
85. Id. at 11.
86. Id. at 12.
87. Id.
88. Id. (quoting Robert J. Bunker & John P. Sullivan, Cartel Evolution Revisited: Third
Phase Cartel Potentials and Alternative Futures in Mexico, 21 SMALL WARS & INSURGENCIES 30,
45 (2010)).
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poor.89 Despite these good deeds, though, LFM is considered Mexico’s
most violent DTO and often uses the same techniques as the Zetas.90
3. Mexico’s Response
The horror story described in the Introduction is by no means an iso-
lated event. In January 2010, fifteen people, mostly teenagers, were killed at
another private party in Ciudad Jua´rez.91 In August 2010, seventy-two mi-
grants passing through Mexico were massacred after they refused to trans-
port drugs.92 Overall, between 2006 and 2011, 45,515 people were killed in
Mexico as a result of organized crime and drug trafficking.93 This number
includes 15,273 murders in 2010 alone.94 Included in that figure are twelve
Mexican mayors and a gubernatorial candidate.95 The Mexican government
reports that 90% of the casualties comprise individuals involved in the drug
trade, though this figure has been questioned.96 Though DTO activity has
been highly concentrated along drug-trafficking routes and in a small per-
centage of Mexican cities, DTO-related violence goes far beyond that asso-
ciated with conventional organized crime.97
Most DTO-murders go unsolved because Mexican authorities lack the
investigative capacity to solve drug murders.98 Mexican forces managed
27,000 arrests in 2010,99 though arrests of DTO members only have a 1–2%
chance of leading to a conviction.100 Some observers already consider parts
of Mexico to be lost to DTO control,101 and public opinion polls suggest
that 49–59% of Mexican citizens believe that DTOs are winning the drug
war.102
Former Mexican President Felipe Caldero´n acknowledged the dangers
that DTOs pose and called drug violence a threat to the Mexican state.103
To deal with this problem, he deployed more than 50,000 military personnel
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Torres, supra note 8.
92. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 1.
93. Lourdes Cardenas, Mexico’s Decision 3-day Series: Combating Cartels Top Priority for
New Leader, EL PASO TIMES, June 26, 2012, http://www.elpasotimes.com/news/ci_20937917/
combating-cartels-top-priority-new-leader; see Sara Miller Llana, Mexico Drug War Death Toll
Up 60 Percent in 2010. Why?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 13, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.
com/World/Americas/2011/0113/Mexico-drug-war-death-toll-up-60-percent-in-2010.-Why.
94. Miller Llana, supra note 93.
95. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 1.
96. Id. at 13.
97. Id. at 13, 25.
98. See COOK, supra note 65, at 15.
99. Miller Llana, supra note 93.
100. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 25–26.
101. Id. at 2.
102. Id. at 23; Miller Llana, supra note 93.
103. COOK, supra note 65, at Summary.
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to confront DTOs.104 Caldero´n’s supporters maintained that a military-led
response was necessary to confront DTOs who are themselves armed with
powerful assault weapons.105 This view is backed by the public, of which
80% still believe that a military-led response is necessary to deal with the
DTOs.106 The U.S. has supplied the Mexican government with $1.6 billion
in aid through the Me´rida Initiative, a program designed by the Bush Ad-
ministration and continued by President Obama that provides the Mexican
government with helicopters, surveillance aircraft, and communications
technology.107
Current Mexico president, Enrique Pen˜a Nieto, has indicated that he
would place less reliance on a military response to DTOs than former Presi-
dent Caldero´n.108 Instead, he has proposed a soldier-officer police force he
calls a “national gendarmerie,” though most consider this to be no different
than the forces used by President Caldero´n.109 A different uniform for gov-
ernment officers will have little impact on the de facto drug war taking
place in Mexico’s streets. Not surprisingly, analysts expect Mexico to con-
tinue its efforts to stamp out DTO-related violence, regardless of whether
this effort is led by a civilian police force, the military, or something in
between.110
B. Sources of International Humanitarian Law
International Humanitarian Law is a subset of international law.111
IHL governs states engaged in armed conflict and it is meant to protect
persons not engaged in combat as well as limiting the ways in which wars
are fought.112 While it is derived from ancient practices and religion, its
universal codification began in the nineteenth century when, at the request
of President Abraham Lincoln, Francis Lieber drafted what became known
104. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 2, 18.
105. Id. at 19–20.
106. Cardenas, supra note 93.
107. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 32; Erin Kelly, Mexican Election May Change How War on
Drugs is Fought, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Mar. 9, 2012, at A1 [hereinafter Mexican Election].
108. Mexican Election, supra note 107; Tim Padgett, Mexico’s PRI-vival: How Big a Gamble
are Voters Taking?, TIME, June 29, 2012. Nieto was elected as president of Mexico on July 2,
2012, a result that has been confirmed by Mexico’s electoral tribunal despite challenges to the
election by his biggest rival, Andres Manuel Lopez Obrador. Lizbeth Diaz, Mexico’s Pena Nieto
Confirmed President-Elect, Rival Defiant, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 31, 2012, http://articles.chicagotrib-
une.com/2012-08-31/news/sns-rt-us-mexico-electionbre87u156-20120831_1_mexico-s-pena-
nieto-cement-and-livestock-congress-over-economic-reforms.
109. Padgett, supra note 108.
110. Mexican Election, supra note 107.
111. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS ADVISORY SERV., THE DOMESTIC IMPLEMENTATION OF
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: A MANUAL 13 (2011) [hereinafter IHL MANUAL] .
112. See id.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST311.txt unknown Seq: 14 10-MAY-13 14:21
946 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
as the Lieber Code.113 This codification of IHL later culminated in the four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 which define a significant amount of IHL.114
There were several later additions to the Geneva Conventions, called Addi-
tional Protocols.115 Additional Protocols I and II were developed in 1977 to
protect victims of armed conflict and Additional Protocol III was developed
in 2005 to codify the rules surrounding the use of a distinctive emblem by
armed forces.116
States are only bound to treaties they have ratified, however, so IHL
would be incomplete if it only consisted of treaty law.117 Instead, IHL is
complimented by what is known as customary international law.118 Cus-
tomary international law is formed by state practice and, in many cases, is
more expansive than existing treaty law.119 Customary international law has
also expanded to include non-international armed conflict.120 Unlike treaty
law, all states are expected to abide by customary international law.121
Modern IHL is thus composed of a complex patchwork of treaties, case law
from international tribunals and national courts which have tackled interna-
tional issues, and customary international law as defined by state
practice.122
C. Application of IHL to Mexico’s conflict with DTOs
Customary international law holds that IHL applies whenever there is
an armed conflict.123 Determining whether there is an armed conflict de-
pends on the facts on the ground as opposed to a formal declaration of
113. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED
CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW xxxi (Reprinted with corrections
2009).
114. IHL MANUAL, supra note 111, at 13.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 34, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty
does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.”); HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 113, at xxxiv (“Treaties apply only to the States that have ratified
them.”).
118. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 113, at xxxiv–xxxv.
119. Id. at xxxv.
120. Id.
121. See Statute of the Int’l. Court of Justice, art. 38, available at www.icj-cij.org/documents/
index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0#CHAPTER_II (“The Court . . . shall apply . . . the general princi-
ples of law recognized by civilized nations.”).
122. See Vite´, supra note 41, at 70–73 (providing background on various treaties and case law
regarding war and international conflict).
123. See, e.g., Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War
art. 2, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention] (“[T]he present
Convention shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict.”); Legality of
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 ¶ 25 (July 8,1996)
[hereinafter Legality of Nuclear Weapons] (making “reference to the law applicable in armed
conflict.”); HCJ 769/02 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. State of Israel [2005] HCJ
769/02, ¶ 18 (Isr.) [hereinafter Public Committee Against Torture] (“[H]umanitarian law . . .
applies in the case of an armed conflict.”).
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war.124 An armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
between states or “protracted armed violence between governmental author-
ities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a State.”125
IHL thus distinguishes between armed conflict involving two states (inter-
national armed conflict), and conflict between a state actor and a non-state
actor (non-international armed conflict).126 Therefore, before IHL would
apply to the situation in Mexico, there must be an international armed con-
flict or a non-international armed conflict.
1. International Armed Conflict
The traditional definition of war envisioned state actors involved in a
military struggle.127 This rule still applies in modern IHL, though the term
“war” has been replaced with international armed conflict.128 In the case of
two conflicted states, international armed conflict takes place whenever
military actors in one state are deliberately hostile to another state.129 Inter-
national case law suggests that foreign military intervention that only indi-
rectly affects an independent internal armed conflict is sufficient to render
that conflict international.130 International armed conflict has some impor-
tant limits to its application, however.
Conflict with a non-state actor only becomes an international conflict
if certain conditions are met.131 Conflict with a non-state actor only be-
comes internationalized when a third-party state assists non-state actors in
attacking a legitimate state actor.132 Conflict does not become international-
ized when a third-party state intervenes on behalf of and with the permis-
sion of the legitimate state actor.133 When a third-party state’s involvement
has internationalized a conflict, IHL case law has placed an emphasis on
third-party involvement that consists of coordination and supervision.134
124. Vite´, supra note 41, at 69, 72.
125. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocu-
tory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995)
[hereinafter Tadic Appeal].
126. See Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, at art. 2–3.
127. See LUBELL, supra note 48, at 94–95 (“Any difference arising between two States and
leading to the intervention of armed forces.”); see also James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Defi-
nition of Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law: A Critique of Internationalized
Armed Conflict, 85 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 313, 316–17 (2003) (explaining the Geneva Conven-
tion of 1949 purposefully distinguished between inter-State conflict and internal conflict).
128. See, e.g., Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 123, at art. 2; LUBELL, supra note 48, at
94.
129. LUBELL, supra note 48, at 95; Vite´, supra note 41, at 72–73.
130. Stewart, supra note 127, at 328.
131. Vite´, supra note 41, at 72–73.
132. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment, ¶ 156 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999) [hereinafter Tadic Judgment].
133. Vite´, supra note 41, at 73.
134. Tadic Judgment, supra note 132, ¶ 156.
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This creates a high bar for international armed conflict that rules out many
situations of combat that do not explicitly involve state actors.
The situation in Mexico would not qualify as an international armed
conflict. DTOs are not allied with any state, nor is there any indication that
they act on another state’s behalf. Even the involvement of the U.S. in the
form of financial assistance and manpower does not internationalize the
conflict because it is done with Mexico’s permission.135 The purchase of
narcotics from DTOs by third-party state actors would also not internation-
alize the conflict. While the sale of narcotics finances DTO operations, this
third-party assistance does not involve coordination and supervision of
DTO activities. Thus it is unlikely that third-party states could international-
ize the conflict by purchasing narcotics from DTOs.136 Because DTOs are
acting on behalf of third-party states, because U.S. involvement in the fight
against DTOs is accomplished with Mexico’s approval, and because third-
party actors trading in narcotics do not have supervision or control over
DTOs, the conflict in Mexico does not qualify as an international armed
conflict.
2. Non-International Armed Conflict
The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions extended the
concept of armed conflict so that IHL may be applied to non-international
conflicts.137 In particular, Additional Protocol II expanded the definition of
armed conflict to cover conflicts between a state and militarized non-state
actors.138 Internal disturbances, such as riots and isolated, sporadic acts of
violence, are not meant to fall within the ambit of Additional Protocol II.139
While Mexico has not ratified Additional Protocol II,140 Additional Proto-
col II’s rules regarding non-international armed conflict have become part
of customary IHL.141 As explained above, every state is expected to abide
by customary IHL regardless of which treaties a state has chosen to rat-
ify.142 Thus, Mexico is bound by Additional Protocol II’s regulations of
non-international armed conflict.
135. See Vite´, supra note 41, at 73.
136. See Tadic Judgment, supra note 132, ¶ 156.
137. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 1(3)–1(4), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conven-
tions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol
II].
138. Additional Protocol II, supra note 137, at art. 1(1).
139. Id. at art. 1(2).
140. International Humanitarian Law – State Parties / Signatories, INT’L COMM. RED CROSS,
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSign?ReadForm&id=475&ps=P (last visited May 6, 2011).
141. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 117.
142. See supra Part II.B.
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There are two requirements to determine whether a situation qualifies
as non-international armed conflict. First, the conflict must involve pro-
tracted armed violence.143 Second, the forces involved must be sufficiently
organized.144 Determining whether these requirements have been met is dif-
ficult, though. Every time a court examining IHL has examined an internal
conflict, it has found there was a non-international armed conflict.145 So
there is no bright line between a situation in which IHL applies and one in
which the violence does not rise to the requisite level or in which the non-
state actor is insufficiently organized. Because there is no contrasting case
law, additional factors are useful in determining whether there is a non-
international armed conflict. These factors include the duration of hostilities
and whether a normal police response is adequate to restore peace and se-
curity. Some scholars have also suggested that non-state actors must have
an ideological or political agenda, though this is of debatable significance.
In sum, these factors all tend to show that the conflict between the Mexican
government and DTOs qualifies as a non-international armed conflict to
which IHL applies.
a. Threshold of Violence
The violence of a given conflict must reach a certain threshold, other-
wise IHL does not apply.146 The violence at stake must be high enough to
set the conflict apart from internal tensions or disturbances.147 Some legal
scholars have set the threshold application of Additional Protocol II at or
near the level of a full-scale civil war; a situation which few countries are
willing to admit exists within their borders.148 As indicated above, though,
IHL has not recognized a situation where the violence is so low that the
situation does not qualify as armed conflict.149 So it’s unclear at which
point there is not enough violence for a situation to qualify as a non-interna-
tional armed conflict.
Between 2006 and 2011, 45,515 people were killed in Mexico as a
result of organized crime and drug trafficking.150 One could argue that this
figure is inflated because it includes the deaths of DTO members. Interna-
tional tribunals examining non-international armed conflict, however, have
143. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70; Vite´, supra note 41, at 76.
144. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70; Vite´, supra note 41, at 76.
145. Vite´, supra note 41, at 77.
146. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of Humanitarian Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 239, 260
(Apr. 2000) (“Conflicts involving lower-intensity violence that do not reach the threshold of an
armed conflict are implicitly distinguished from noninternational armed conflicts.”).
147. Vite´, supra note 41, at 79.
148. Meron, supra note 146, at 261 (citing Minimum Humanitarian Standards: Analytical Re-
port of the Secretary-General Submitted Pursuant to Commission on Human Rights Resolution
1997/21, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/87, para. 79 (1998)).
149. See Vite´, supra note 41, at 77.
150. Cardenas, supra note 93.
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not discounted the deaths of non-state actors participating in the vio-
lence.151 Even if they did, though, that still means more than 4,500 civilians
and security personnel have been killed in a four year period using the ques-
tionable estimates provided by the Mexican government.152 In comparison,
the Israeli Supreme Court held that Israel was involved in a non-interna-
tional armed conflict with terrorists when that conflict resulted in the deaths
of 900 Israelis, thousands of Palestinians, and wounded thousands on both
sides.153
Of course, no crude comparison of human suffering will yield a clear
answer as to whether there is a non-international armed conflict, but formal
sources of IHL have yet to find a situation in which the level of violence is
too low for the struggle to qualify as non-international armed conflict. If a
court were to find that not enough people have died in Mexico, it would be
a first in international law. Such a precedent would set the threshold of
violence exceedingly high and prevent the application of IHL in future
cases when a conflict had the potential to affect tens of thousands of lives.
This result would be directly contrary to the main goal of IHL which is to
minimize the impact of violence during times of conflict.154 Thus, the level
of violence in Mexico should allow for the application of IHL, a result that
is consistent with the other factors.
b. Organization of the Non-State Actor
Another requirement of non-international armed conflict is that the
non-state actor must be comprised of sufficiently organized forces,155
though the exact level of organization required is not clear.156 Some schol-
ars have suggested that the non-state actors must be under responsible,
identifiable authority and must be clearly distinguishable from civilians.157
“Responsible authority” does not mean that the authority in question is act-
ing responsibly. Rather, it means that the armed forces are subject to a sys-
tem of internal discipline that makes it possible to enforce the law of armed
conflicts.158
The requirement of responsible authority makes eminent sense—if
IHL is to apply to a conflict, then parties to the conflict should be capable
of conforming to the rules mandated by IHL. If an organization does not
151. See, e.g., Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 16.
152. See BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 22 (explaining that the Mexican government said more than
90% of those killed were involved with the activities of the DTOs).
153. Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 16. Granted, that situation qualified
as an international armed conflict, but because it demonstrated a conflict between state actors and
non-state actors, it provides a useful yardstick.
154. IHL MANUAL, supra note 111, at 13.
155. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70; Vite´, supra note 41, at 76.
156. See Vite´, supra note 41, at 77.
157. Stewart, supra note 127, at 345.
158. Id. at 346.
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have the capability to control their members because of insufficient organi-
zation, it does not matter whether IHL applies because members are in es-
sence acting as free agents. Along the same lines, the presence of
responsible authority allows international tribunals to identify and punish
leaders who have violated IHL. On the other hand, placing too much em-
phasis on whether the authority is identifiable or whether the forces are
clearly distinguished from the civilian population ignores the essential real-
ity of many conflicts involving non-state actors. Despite their variance in
structure, Mexico’s major DTOs fulfill the organizational requirement.
Some, such as the Zetas, have a rigid, hierarchical command structure
which clearly suffices.159 Others, such as the Sinaloa DTO are less organ-
ized, with a decentralized structure.160
This lack of organization should not prevent the Sinaloa and similar
DTOs from qualifying as an organized armed group, however. First, Sina-
loa and similar DTOs are growing, profitable businesses and all businesses,
even illicit ones, must have a certain level of structure in order to grow and
be profitable.161 Second, disqualifying Sinaloa as an organized, armed
group would also disqualify the application of IHL to conflicts involving
terrorists and insurgent groups with a similar de-centralized structure. This
result would be inconsistent with existing IHL, which has found that terror-
ist groups may be a party to an armed conflict.162 Finally, though it is de-
centralized, Sinaloa does have means to enforce discipline. While the
discipline employed would likely be violent, Sinaloa could require its mem-
bers to conform to the laws of armed conflict. Thus, even decentralized
DTOs like Sinaloa have enough organization to qualify as a party to a non-
international armed conflict.
c. Duration of the Conflict
International courts and IHL case law indicate that violence must be
protracted for IHL to apply.163 Again, this is a difficult threshold to define
with any certainty because formal sources of IHL have yet to find a situa-
tion where the violence has not persisted long enough for the struggle to
159. Flintoff, supra note 81.
160. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 6.
161. See Brian Hill, The Importance of a Good Organizational Structure, CHRON.COM, http://
smallbusiness.chron.com/importance-good-organizational-structure-3792.html (last visited May 6,
2011).
162. See LUBELL, supra note 48, at 112–21. Lubell comes to the conclusion that, on the world
stage, Al-Qaeda cannot be considered a party to an armed conflict, but could be a party to an
armed conflict in Afghanistan. See id. at 119–21. This does not change the article’s analysis since
the battle against DTOs more closely resembles the war in Afghanistan as opposed to the global
war on terror. Both conflicts share features of localized violence, clear if diffuse organization of
the non-state actors, and a greater distinction between belligerents and civilians than that found in
the global war on terror. See id.
163. Vite´, supra note 41, at 82; Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70.
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qualify as non-international armed conflict.164 For the sake of example,
though, the International Criminal Tribunal of Yugoslavia found there was
a protracted armed conflict where fighting lasted four years.165 The Israeli
Supreme Court found there was protracted armed violence between the
state and terrorist figures where the fighting lasted for three years.166
In comparison, DTOs have functioned in Mexico for more than a cen-
tury, with violence increasing dramatically since the 1980s.167 Even if one
were only to count the last four years that violence has reached unprece-
dented levels, this is enough to qualify as “protracted violence” under
IHL.168 A comparison here is easier to make than the comparison to deter-
mine whether the violence has reached a necessary threshold.169 A compari-
son of lives lost from one situation to the next may be challenged by
examining the number of deaths relevant to the population or asking
whether those killed were innocent civilians or participants in the vio-
lence.170 A comparison of duration is the same anywhere, though, and three
or four years of fighting in Israel or Yugoslavia lasts as long as three or four
years of fighting in Mexico. Thus, the length of the conflict in Mexico is
consistent with the application of IHL.
d. Inadequacy of a Normal Police Response
Another factor suggested by legal scholars that would tend to show an
armed conflict would be the inadequacy of normal police forces in main-
taining peace and security.171 This is especially true when the state is con-
fronting organizations with military capabilities that exceed those of state
actors.172 It is axiomatic in international law that one of the basic functions
of a state is to provide peace and security for its citizens and to maintain a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force.173 If a state’s normal police forces
are insufficient to combat organized armed groups, resort to the laws of
armed conflict may be the only way for a state to maintain its legitimacy.
This was envisioned by the drafters of Additional Protocol II, who looked
164. See Vite´, supra note 41, at 77.
165. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70.
166. Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 16.
167. See BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 3, 5.
168. See Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70.
169. See supra Part II.C.2.a.
170. Neither of these factors is considered relevant by international bodies when determining
whether the threshold of violence is enough to qualify as non-international armed conflict. See,
e.g., Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 70; Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 16.
Instead these factors are addressed here to show that it is easier to find that the duration of vio-
lence is indicative of an armed conflict than it is to do the same using the level of violence.
171. Vite´, supra note 41, at 76.
172. Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 21.
173. Verdross, supra note 17, at 574 (listing the minimum functions of a state); WEBER, supra
note 16, at 154.
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to apply the law of armed conflict when an organized non-state actor exer-
cised military control over state territory.174
Given the current conditions of the conflict and the escalating vio-
lence, Mexico would seem to provide a prime example of a situation where
its normal police forces are inadequate. Mexico’s DTOs have challenged
the state’s monopoly on the use of force and rule of law.175 As indicated
above, some observers already consider parts of Mexico to be lost to DTO
control.176 Even if Mexico improved its police force and reduced corrup-
tion, it is unclear whether it would have the capability to directly confront
DTOs armed with military hardware and tactics.177 Thus, to treat Mexico’s
government confrontation with DTOs as an internal police matter would
ignore the inability of its police forces to maintain peace and security and
would, in turn, threaten the Mexican government’s ability to maintain its
legitimacy.
e. Ideological or Political Motive
Some legal scholars have considered that a non-international armed
conflict requires that the non-state actor have a political or ideological mo-
tive.178 This would rule out groups of a purely criminal nature.179 In partic-
ular, Noah Feldman has distinguished several criteria that determine
whether the law of war (i.e. IHL) applies, two of which, intent and identity,
imply a political motive requirement.180 According to him, the actor’s iden-
tity is important because “[o]ur intuition tells us that states make wars and
individuals commit crimes.”181 Feldman also examines the intent of the ac-
tor, finding that one who commits war intends to challenge the legitimacy
of the state, whereas a criminal “does not deny the state’s legitimate right to
enact the law that he violates.”182
The political component is of negligible importance, however, when
attempting to determine whether the conflict with DTOs qualifies as non-
international armed conflict. First, there is no clear indication for this re-
174. Stewart, supra note 127, at 319.
175. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 25.
176. Id. at 2.
177. See Flintoff, supra note 81.
178. Vite´, supra note 41, at 78; Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, Choices of War, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 459–61 (2002).
179. Vite´, supra note 41, at 78.
180. Feldman, supra note 178, at 459–61. Feldman lists the following criteria as determining
whether the law of war applies: the identity of the actor, the jurisdiction wherein the act occurs,
the intent of the actor, and the scale of the hostilities. Id. The jurisdictional element does not apply
because this discussion concerns non-international armed conflict which, by definition, involves
armed conflict occurring within the boundaries of the affected state. The scale criterion is ana-
lyzed in the discussion regarding the threshold and duration of violence. See supra Parts II.B.2.a,
II.B.2.c.
181. Feldman, supra note 178, at 459.
182. Id. at 460.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\9-3\UST311.txt unknown Seq: 22 10-MAY-13 14:21
954 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:3
quirement in international law.183 Second, it is often difficult to tell whether
a group is using criminal methods to fund a political uprising or vice
versa.184 DTOs may have both political and criminal objectives, with one
justifying the other. The LFM DTO provides a prime example of this confu-
sion in that it combines an ideology with intensive drug-trafficking opera-
tions.185 Further, the cartels’ wide-scale disregard for the rule of law and
corruption of public officials does plenty of harm to the legitimacy of the
Mexican government, irrespective of the cartels’ motives.
More importantly, a motive requirement does not add anything of sub-
stance to this analysis. The only value this factor could add would be to
prevent the application of IHL to internal disturbances and tensions.186 But
the factors listed above (i.e. the threshold of violence, the organization of
the actor, the duration of the conflict, and the inadequacy of a normal police
response) will exclude internal disturbances and tensions that should not
come under the rubric of IHL. Instead, a legal regime which draws a clear
distinction of when the rules of IHL apply achieves better protection for
civilians and combatants alike.187 Because any motive requirement only
muddies the water regarding the application of IHL without adding a dis-
cernible benefit, it should not be a contributing factor in making this
determination.
The situation in Mexico therefore satisfies the requirements for a non-
international armed conflict. It has the requisite level of violence and the
non-state actors involved are sufficiently organized. Additionally, the vio-
lence is of a “protracted” duration and normal police forces have been inad-
equate in addressing the threat DTOs pose to Mexican citizens. Despite the
insistence on a higher threshold being necessary to find a non-international
armed conflict, non-international armed conflict has been found every time
there has been a situation of protracted armed violence.188 Examination of
the conflict in Mexico shows that it too warrants the designation of a non-
international armed conflict.
D. The Effect of IHL on the Conflict with DTOs
The application of IHL has a profound change on the nature of any
violent conflict. When an armed conflict falls within the jurisdiction of IHL,
the laws of peace arguably become irrelevant.189 Under normal criminal
183. Vite´, supra note 41, at 78.
184. See id.
185. See BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 12.
186. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 137, at art. 1(2).
187. Roy S. Scho¨ndorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need for a New Legal Re-
gime?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 22 (2004).
188. Vite´, supra note 41, at 76.
189. Scho¨ndorf, supra note 187, at 21; see also Additional Protocol I, supra note 137, at art.
43(2) (“Members of the armed forces of a Party to a conflict . . . are combatants, that is to say,
they have the right to participate directly in hostilities.”).
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law, a criminal is pursued with the intent to effectuate his capture, whereas
pursuit under IHL takes the form of pursuit with the intent to kill.190 Not
only does IHL give legitimate parties a legal right to kill opposing forces, it
even allows for collateral damage to civilians.191 Nonetheless, this conflict
does not take place in a legal vacuum. A number of customary principles
apply in any armed conflict, including the principles of distinction and pro-
portionality.192 This section will briefly review these principles and will
explain which protections IHL extends to combatants. This section will also
show how these principles would apply in Mexico’s conflict with DTOs.
1. The Principles of Distinction and Proportionality
a. The Principle of Distinction
The principle of distinction is a rule of customary international law
that forbids attacks upon civilians.193 Civilians lose this protection when
one of two things occurs: (1) the citizen directly participates in hostilities;
or (2) the citizen identifies with the armed group. First, citizens lose the
protections of IHL for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.194
Direct participation in hostilities means acts that would reasonably be ex-
pected to cause harm in the prevailing circumstances.195 In addition to ac-
tive, hostile engagement with opposing forces, direct participation includes
measures in preparation for acts of hostilities and the deployment to and
return from hostilities.196 A civilian also directly participates in hostilities if
he joins an organization involved in internal armed conflict and commits
hostilities in the framework of his role with only short rests in between.197
Second, a civilian loses the protection of IHL when the civilian joins
an organized armed group. When a civilian joins an armed group, he for-
feits his citizenship status altogether until he explicitly denounces member-
ship in the organization.198 This classification only includes those involved
in a continuous combat function and excludes recruiters, trainers, finan-
ciers, and propagandists.199 This classification fits within the framework of
Additional Protocol II, which distinguishes between members of organized
190. Feldman, supra note 178, at 466–68.
191. Meron, supra note 146, at 240.
192. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶¶ 105, 110–11.
193. Id.
194. Additional Protocol I, supra note 137, at art. 51(3).
195. NILS MELZER, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NO-
TION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 47
(2009) (prepared by Nils Melzer), available at http://www.aco.nato.int/resources/20/Legal%20
Conference/ICRC_002_0990.pdf [hereinafter MELZER].
196. Id. at 17.
197. Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 39.
198. MELZER, supra note 195, at 25.
199. Id. at 34.
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armed forces and civilians.200 This change in classification, from citizen to
a member in an organized armed group, is distinct from the example of a
citizen directly participating in hostilities. The former looks to the person’s
identity and association while the latter only examines the citizen’s conduct.
In the case of Mexican DTO members, it is more appropriate to view
them as members of organized armed forces rather than citizens directly
participating in hostilities. Given the general violent nature of DTOs, most,
if not all, members would qualify as holding a continuous combat role.
Conversely, defining a chain of acts that constitutes direct participation in
hostilities would be far more difficult. Further, removing immunity to at-
tack based solely on membership in a DTO would likely have a detrimental
effect on DTO membership as a whole. Because DTOs represent a conflu-
ence between drugs and violence, DTO members engaged in smuggling
should be targeted. Though this would seem incongruent with the definition
of a continuous combat role, the whole purpose of a DTO is to smuggle
drugs. To ignore these members as targets would ignore the driving force of
the violence in Mexico and would greatly diminish any efforts to reduce it.
b. The Principle of Proportionality
Another way in which customary international law protects civilians is
the customary rule of proportionality.201 An attack must not cause damage
that is in excess of the “concrete and direct military advantage antici-
pated.”202 This is a difficult balancing test, but it must be done.203 This
principle reduces the range of military actions to those which are necessary
in order to accomplish a legitimate military purpose.204 Thus, to accurately
determine proportionality, it is important to determine the military value of
a target. The goals stated by the Obama Administration in looking to re-
fund the Me´rida Initiative provide a good starting point for this balancing
process. These goals include: (1) the disruption of organized crime groups;
(2) institutionalizing the rule of law; (3) modernizing efforts to prevent
drugs from crossing borders; and (4) building strong and resilient
communities.205
These goals would require the Mexican government to limit civilian
casualties to the fullest extent possible, lest they undermine goals (2)–(4).
The U.S. invasion of Panama, wherein U.S. forces engaged narco-traffick-
ers, gives some guidelines on how this may be done. In that campaign,
efforts to limit civilian casualties were at the very core of the planning pro-
200. Id. at 28.
201. Legality of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 123, ¶ 20 (separate opinion of Judge Higgins).
202. Additional Protocol I, supra note 137, at art. 57(b); Public Committee Against Torture,
supra note 123, at ¶ 45.
203. Public Committee Against Torture, supra note 123, ¶ 46.
204. MELZER, supra note 195, at 79.
205. BEITTEL, supra note 9, at 32.
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cess.206 These efforts can be implemented in several ways. First, govern-
ment forces should show restraint depending on the relative level of control
they have over the circumstances and area.207 This is especially important
since DTO-related violence is highly concentrated. Second, government
forces should always be willing to accept surrender as an option.208 Third,
even if members of DTOs are not protected from attack, they should be
captured alive, assuming that this can be done without additional risk to
government forces or to civilians.209 In the end, the Mexican public’s per-
ception of any civilian death toll may be the ultimate arbiter as to whether
the principle of proportionality was preserved.210 Efforts such as those
listed above would limit casualties and would therefore increase the chance
that the public would approve of military efforts to confront DTOs.
2. Protections Offered to Combatants Through the Application of
IHL
Participants involved in an armed conflict are offered some basic pro-
tections. First, they cannot be targeted by weapons designed to inflict un-
necessary suffering.211 Second, and perhaps of greater significance, the
application of IHL allows legitimate forces to legally kill the opposition.212
Further, legitimate military forces are entitled to prisoner-of-war status if
captured during hostilities.213 Thus, while they would still be subject to the
principles of distinction and proportionality mentioned above, Mexican
armed forces would have the legal right to kill DTO members. If a DTO
captured a member of the Mexican armed forces, the DTO would be re-
quired by IHL to hold that person as a prisoner of war.
The same protections would not apply to DTO members. Civilians and
members of organized armed groups belonging to non-State parties do not
have the right to kill and may be prosecuted for their activities during the
206. INVESTIGATIONS SUBCOMM., COMM. ARMED SERV., 102D CONG., THE INVASION OF PAN-
AMA: HOW MANY INNOCENT BYSTANDERS PERISHED? 9 (Comm. Print 1992) [hereinafter INVA-
SION OF PANAMA].
207. See MELZER, supra note 195, at 80–81.
208. See id. at 82; see also INVASION OF PANAMA, supra note 206, at 10.
209. See MELZER, supra note 195, at 81–82. In a sense, this combines the traditional response
to crime with the options available to parties to an armed conflict. See also Feldman, supra note
178, at 457 (arguing that some situations “can plausibly be characterized as both crime and war
and that these cases therefore undermine the binary character of the crime/war distinction”). This
combination curiously mirrors President Nieto’s concept of a soldier-officer police force. Padgett,
supra note 108.
210. See INVASION OF PANAMA, supra note 206, at 9 (“If future relations are undermined
because the Panamanian public feels the civilian death toll was too high . . . the death toll was too
high because the result was to undermine one of the political goals of the operation.”).
211. Tadic Appeal, supra note 125, ¶ 127.
212. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 137, at art. 43(2); see Legality of Nuclear Weapons,
supra note 123, ¶ 25.
213. Additional Protocol I, supra note 137, at art. 45(1).
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conflict.214 Further, in order to qualify as a prisoner of war, one must be
commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, have a fixed dis-
tinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carry arms openly, and conduct
operations in accordance with IHL.215 It is inconceivable that DTO mem-
bers would wear uniforms or openly carry weapons which would, in turn,
identify them as targets for the military. Also, given the history of civilian
deaths they have caused so far, it is unlikely DTOs can be expected to
conform to IHL. As participants in an armed conflict, DTO members can be
prosecuted for violations of IHL and other international criminal law.216
Thus, the application of IHL to the conflict in Mexico would increase the
criminal liabilities DTOs face.
CONCLUSION
The conflict between legitimate state actors and DTOs has reached
dire proportions. The increasing rise in drug-related killings shows no sig-
nificant signs of abatement, nor does it appear that police forces can deal
with the problem alone. Unfortunately, the U.N. Charter creates many barri-
ers for countries who wish to confront these criminal organizations outside
their own borders. IHL, on the other hand, opens doors for countries faced
with domestic DTOs. In Mexico, it is apparent that the government’s con-
flict with DTOs is a non-international armed conflict for which direct mili-
tary action is a legal recourse under international law. This paper makes no
claim that a military solution is the best or even the ideal solution for deal-
ing with violent, drug-funded gangs. Through the application of IHL, how-
ever, government forces are given an expanded toolbox with which to
oppose these groups while the DTOs face greater threats in the form of
direct military action and greater criminal accountability.
214. MELZER, supra note 195, at 84; Stewart, supra note 127, at 320.
215. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4(A)(2), Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
216. MELZER, supra note 195, at 85.
